From an exchange in US History II (DF 8, Thread "The Unsetting, Unsettling Sun"):
We were discussing the 1920s and the rise of the liberal churches and a widespread rejection of Christianity and the Bible as literal truth. We discussed this in part as it manifested in evolutionary theory, but this thread dealt more with the widespread rejection of the Bible's infallibility on the supposed grounds that science made authority unnecessary and made nonsense of some Biblical statements (e.g., that the sun stood still in Joshua 10). The italicized portions are my classmates' posts, the plain text ones are mine.
In any case, I likewise think that it is sad, not so much that people accepted some form of evolution, but that they then proceeded to build their theology on this idea of evolutionary progress--i.e., postmillenialism, the perfectibility of man, man's inherent/progressive goodness, etc. I am a six-day, young earth creationist, don't get me wrong, but, so long as my fellow Christians hold to a universe that is governed by God's providence (i.e., there is no random evolution, and no materialistic evolution), I personally think there are bigger fish to fry than theistic evolution. In any case, in apologetics, you must first deal with how unbelievers interpret the evidence before evidence contrary to their views means anything to them; this is what I appreciate about presuppositional apologetics.
But before I go off on that tangent (and no, I'm not debating that point), it has also struck me how theories of science affect theories of man and philosophy. Specifically, I have not been able to grasp before how one could make the leap from saying that matter, time, and space are relative to saying that morals and truth are relative. I was pondering it today, though, and it hit me--this makes perfect sense in a material world. If matter is all there is, and truth and morality are merely byproducts of matter, and matter is relative, then it follows indeed that truth and morality are relative.
Then again, if matter is relative, and our minds are merely matter, then even our perception of reality is relative--but to what? It would be more accurate to say that we (if we can even use personal pronouns) can have no confidence that our minds have any correlation to what is really there--it may be ordered or it may not be, but our minds cannot know because we don't even know what our minds are.
Epistemology and metaphysics are inextricably intertwined, and the major question of each (what is? How do we know?) must be answered simultaneously, in both objective being and subjective knowledge of that being and of our own being--I believe that the objective and unchanging revelation of God and the world in Scripture and the faith (being subjective knowledge correlative to objective being, not Kierkegaard's "leap") that is a gift imparted sovereignly by God to His are the only sufficient answers for those questions.
Okay, so that's my idea of philosophy, history, and science in a nutshell.... People can either make themselves the arbiters of what is and what can be known (and since we are finite reference points, this should be self-evidently foolish), or we can accept the rightful claim of the Lord who created us and the universe and thus has the right to interpret it and tell us what is, who we are, and what our meaning is.
"If matter is all there is, and truth and morality are merely byproducts of matter, and matter is relative, then it follows indeed that truth and morality are relative."
While matter may change, do the laws affecting matter change?
Aha! I knew this was bound to come up sooner or later. This strikes at the heart of materialism.
What laws? How do we know that there are laws? We observe that something happens over and over again (say, the sun rises every morning), and say that this is a "law," but, strictly speaking, it's not. "The sun rises every morning" is descriptive of what we have observed, but is not prescriptive because we have observed it. We cannot say with absolute certainty, only with high probability, that the sun will rise tomorrow. To say that it is a prescriptive certainty, we'd have to have access to all information about all the universe, and not just the fact, but also the meaning and relation of those facts. We do not have those, and if we are dealing with an atheistic worldview, no one does.
So, in materialism, it is an ASSUMPTION that there are unchangeable laws governing matter. As I was pointing out before, in the materialistic worldview, the world may or may not be ordered--we don't know. If we try to observe and make sense of it, we are ASSUMING A) that there is a reality outside our minds, B) that our minds are ordered and can have knowledge correlative to reality and C) that reality can be ordered. Note that, in trying to decide whether the universe is rational or not, it is ASSUMED that our minds are rational. But our minds are part of the material universe, so this point, by their standard, should not be assumed. Rationalism, from the start, assumes itself, but without good reason.
If you want to say that we can't know universal laws as absolutes (which, I'll concede, we can't), you're left with a few things.
1) God. But what if, as Descartes posited, "God" is merely a malicious demon out to deceive me? What if, as he further posited, "God" is my projection of authority onto a creation of my own imagination? Both of those show that it's possible (unlikely, but possible) that God does not exist and does not reveal Himself.
2) My senses. My senses are, in essence, five ways in which my brain interprets electrical signals. Sight, Sound, Scent, Taste, and Touch are all in my mind. It is possible (unlikely, but possible) that everything I sense is, as in a dream, just a figment of my imagination.
3) My mind. This is really a two-parter. My brain, which may or may not exist (again - it likely does, but there's that slim chance that it doesn't and I'm just a metaphysical consciousness), and my consciousness (important enough to be a fourth point).
4) My consciousness. I am. I exist. I know I exist because I am conscious of the question of my existence. I think, therefore I am. If I know nothing else absolutely, I know that I exist because, if I didn't exist, I wouldn't be thinking about this.
None of that is to say that objective reality's actual existence is doubtful, but it is to say that, like the rising of the sun, there is the slimmest of chances that the earth does not exist, that my senses mislead me, that God does not exist, and that I am the only inhabitant of reality.
1) I'll deal with this more fully in point 4, but for now note that even Descartes eventually deduced that, for his mind to exist and have any correlation to reality, there had to be a God external to himself. He was self-conscious first, chronologically, but his self-consciousness presupposed an external God.
2) Agreed.
3) As you separate the idea of consciousness from the necessity of a brain, I agree with your summary so far as it goes, though I must note that it is incompatible with materialism. In a truly materialistic world, all things must be explained in terms of matter/energy (which, as you'll remember, have recently been discovered to be interchangeable. ;-)).
4) .1 First of all, as noted above, for a consciousness to exist without matter is contradictory to the fundamental assumption of materialism--that all phenomena can be eventually explained in terms of matter. That is what we were originally discussing. Descartes was not a strict materialist, and in fact was a rationalist in a specific sense (which, in his time, was opposed to an empiricist). I use "rationalist" in the broader sense of "a believer in objective reality and our ability to understand it by our use of reason," as opposed to "irrationalist"; if Ayn Rand's specific philosophy hadn't already been labeled "objectivism," "objectivism v. subjectivism" would be a fair denominator of the two points. Both Descartes' rationalism and Hume's empiricism would fall under objectivism in that broad sense. Existentialism and New Age philosophy would fall under subjectivism--Hinduism would be more precisely described as "irrationalist."
Okay, so with the understanding that this goes beyond the strict materialism (empiricism) which was at issue in the first place, I continue. ;-)
4.2. First of all, realize that the truth of "I think, therefore I am" is under debate. I haven't read the argument myself, but someone, I think Nietszche or Hegel, posited that being itself was merely a result of abstract Idea--in other words, "I" is a result of Thought which no one is thinking, but just exists in some abstract sense. So even then, there is no concrete "I." Indeed, if being is a product of Idea, then ultimately you come to the point, I think, where you cannot distinguish being and thus "I" becomes nonsense as a distinguisher (think of the "nirvana" of Buddhism, wherein identity is lost).
Anyway, my point is that Descartes' argument is not absolutely fool-proof, from the standpoint of unrevealed philosophy.
4.3 Also note that Descartes, though he was first self-conscious, realized that his self-consciousness did not merely point to the existence of a transcendent, eternal being (God), but REQUIRED it. Descartes would disagree that you (or he or "I") could possibly be the only inhabitant of reality. God is required.
Read a summary of his argument here.
4.4 Further, to return strictly to your argument, even if we know that I exist ("I" defined as the being doubting), it is, for the materialist, a leap of faith to begin making judgments on material reality and on the nature of his existence. He must KNOW the nature of his existence before he can trust his ability to reason, and he cannot reason out the nature of his existence for precisely that reason. There is a necessity for innate knowledge or granted knowledge.
4.5 Christian theology provides some grounds of innate knowledge. Romans 1 says that all men know that God exists and at least some of His attributes. It may also be in 1, but it's somewhere in the Pauline epistles, wherein it is said that all men also know, in some sense, right and wrong. It is because they actively suppress that knowledge that they do not acknowledge it.
Further, Christ is revealed by granted knowledge. He cannot be discovered or rendered reasonable simply by rationalization (1 Corinthians 1, 2) but is revealed by the Spirit to those whom God has chosen. Those who do not believe "do not believe because you are not my sheep." (John 10:26). Those who do believe do so because belief has been granted them--faith is a gift (Ephesians 2:8) and is not just trust, not Kierkegaard's "leap" (as too many mainstream churches present it), not simply a subjective choice, but knowledge. Pistos is the Greek word for faith, and you may recognize that as the root for "epistemology," the study of theories of knowledge. "Faith is the substance of things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen."
Faith is not the opposite of reason, but is rather the grounds of reason--one could just as well call one's faith one's assumptions or presuppositions. The materialist assumes that reality exists and that it can be ordered and future decisions can be accurately extrapolated from it. In a sense, these assumptions are a faith. I believe, however, that these assumptions are faulty and will ultimately lead to self-contradiction (and, btw, I don't believe that one can reach Christian faith strictly by the operation of autonomous reason). The Christian's implanted faith in God is the grounds for his reason, and is consistent in its epistemology and metaphysics--the questions of those fields (what is? How do we know?) are simultaneously answered by God. God is and has created us, and we know because He tells us both objectively in Scriptural revelation and subjectively by the witness of the Spirit which enables us to accept His objective revelation.
"The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." Proverbs 1:7
Showing posts with label apologetics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label apologetics. Show all posts
Thursday, April 17, 2008
Thursday, April 3, 2008
Presuppositionalism and Calvinism: the Biblical Answers to the Fundamental Problem of Epistemology
Discussion forum post by Colin Cutler from Principles of Biblical Reasoning, fall 2007:
"I cannot forgive Descartes. In his whole philosophy he would like to do without God. But he cannot help allowing him with a flick of the fingers to set the world in motion. After that he has no more use for God." ~Blaise Pascal
I read the first few of Descartes' "Meditations on First Philosophy" my junior year of high school. Sometime in the following year, I also read Francis Schaeffer's "How Should We Then Live?", and I was surprised by his criticism of Descartes' philosophy. After all, Descartes set out to prove the existence of God; what problem could an evangelical such as Schaeffer have with that? I came to realize later, though (especially in the last year or so), that Schaeffer's problem was not so much with the substance of Descartes' philosophy as with the methodology. Descartes strips all belief away, coming to rest on what he saw as the sole irrefutable first principle: "I think, therefore I am."
However, even in this, Descartes assumed that a person must be doing the thinking and that he was that person; many would later come to question this principle as well. As it turns out, starting from empirical evidence, there is no way to know. Materialistic philosophy and empirical scientism is necessarily arbitrary. Philosophers--and especially scientists--posit that we are in a closed deterministic system, because for it not to be so would defy natural law. Note the self-evident circular argument: all things must work according to natural law, or they would not work according to natural law. However, they have no way of knowing that there IS natural law or that what they have observed to be normal is actually prescriptively normative; for all they know, it could be random chance that these facts coincide (and, in fact, most materialist do believe random chance coexists with natural law). The problem is, though, that if there is random chance, then simply one counterexample could disprove their entire theory of natural law as prescriptive, and that one counterexample could possibly exist. If it can possibly exist, then natural law is not prescriptive.
For example, we may observe nerve synapses firing, but--the question of whether we really observe them or not aside--we only associate these with thought because, in all observed circumstances, thought occurs when nerve synapses fire. That we have observed this in all past cases does not necessarily mean that the firing of nerve synapses causes thought. It makes it very likely, but if there is any possibility of variation, it would follow that the firing of nerve synapses is not the absolute cause of thought. (if you can't tell, I put little stock in statistics)
The problem is in attempting to argue from particulars to universals, then back again. Biologists classify observed animals by observed similarities: e.g., all insects have six legs. More properly put, though, all animals with exoskeletons and six legs are classified as insects. Scientists observe all animals with exoskeletons and six legs, and then arbitrarily class them together. There is nothing inherently wrong in this, as a means of referential classification, but they must remember that the proposition "all insects have six legs" is only true by their own stipulated definition as to what an insect is. If the universal "insect" only has definition in reference to the particulars which it comprises (grasshoppers, ants, cicadas), then any further particulars that are thrust into that universal are thus classified, not because of any relation they have to the universal, but the relation they have to the other particulars.
It is in this way that postmodernists rightly critique modernists for their dogmatism: the modernist has no right to be dogmatic when all he is doing is imposing subjective categories upon facts that may or may not be ultimately categorized. Postmodernists rightly critique all philosophies based upon human autonomy as necessarily subjective.
The error of the postmodernists, though, is in then positing that there is no objective truth. That our subjective systems are not objective does not mean that there is no true object of knowledge, but rather that our systems probably do not coincide with it. They are also correct to say that we cannot know what objective truth is, starting from ourselves. Any attempt to categorize is, as they constantly point out, arbitrary.
There is, however, at least one option that would explain and give an adequate foundation for knowledge: a combination of external and internal interpretive revelation by a Person who is non-creation, yet involved in creation. It cannot be solely external revelation (as with the Deists), for that assumes (wrongly) that our senses are adequate to accurately read the world around us AND that our categorization of "brute facts" is correct." This is strict particularism. Nor can it be solely internal revelation (certain forms of mysticism), for then our knowledge has no correlation with observation, the nature of external being in our view is compromised, and there is no higher common standard by which we can appeal to others. Nor can it even be a definite external revelation with an indefinite internal revelation (such as the "suasive grace" of Wesleyans, Arminians, Romanists, etc.), for then we still have no KNOWLEDGE that our belief correlates to truth, only a persuasion that it does so. Nor can the Person be a part of, or the whole of, creation (as with the pantheists), for then it speaks with no authority as a universal cause of being, and there is no allowance or meaning for particulars; this is strict universalism (in the metaphysical sense, not the soteriological). Strict particularism has facts with no meaning, thus no way to interpret the brute facts; strict universalism has meaning, but no distinct facts to mean anything.
For us to have knowledge, we must have a definite external revelation to which our knowledge must correlate, and definite internal revelation that the external revelation is true. We have the former in the Bible, which purports to be the very words of God, and through which He tells us what the world is, what the meaning of it and its events are, how it came to be, and where it is going. Through it, He tells us who we are, and how we ought to live and why. The latter we have in the witness of the Holy Spirit, by the grace of regeneration and the gift of faith (what is popularly known as "irresistible grace," but more properly as "efficient grace"), which He sovereignly grants to those whom the Father has loved since before the beginning of time.
"For since, in the wisdom of God, the world through wisdom did not know God, it pleased God through the foolishness of the message preached to save those who believe. For Jews request a sign, and Greeks seek after wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling block and to the Greeks foolishness, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God....the hidden wisdom which God ordained before the ages for our glory, which none of the rulers of this age knew; for had they known, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory....But God has revealed them to us through His spirit....Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God, that we might know the things that have been freely given to us by God." (1 Cor. 1:21-24, 2:7, 8, 10, 12)
"I cannot forgive Descartes. In his whole philosophy he would like to do without God. But he cannot help allowing him with a flick of the fingers to set the world in motion. After that he has no more use for God." ~Blaise Pascal
I read the first few of Descartes' "Meditations on First Philosophy" my junior year of high school. Sometime in the following year, I also read Francis Schaeffer's "How Should We Then Live?", and I was surprised by his criticism of Descartes' philosophy. After all, Descartes set out to prove the existence of God; what problem could an evangelical such as Schaeffer have with that? I came to realize later, though (especially in the last year or so), that Schaeffer's problem was not so much with the substance of Descartes' philosophy as with the methodology. Descartes strips all belief away, coming to rest on what he saw as the sole irrefutable first principle: "I think, therefore I am."
However, even in this, Descartes assumed that a person must be doing the thinking and that he was that person; many would later come to question this principle as well. As it turns out, starting from empirical evidence, there is no way to know. Materialistic philosophy and empirical scientism is necessarily arbitrary. Philosophers--and especially scientists--posit that we are in a closed deterministic system, because for it not to be so would defy natural law. Note the self-evident circular argument: all things must work according to natural law, or they would not work according to natural law. However, they have no way of knowing that there IS natural law or that what they have observed to be normal is actually prescriptively normative; for all they know, it could be random chance that these facts coincide (and, in fact, most materialist do believe random chance coexists with natural law). The problem is, though, that if there is random chance, then simply one counterexample could disprove their entire theory of natural law as prescriptive, and that one counterexample could possibly exist. If it can possibly exist, then natural law is not prescriptive.
For example, we may observe nerve synapses firing, but--the question of whether we really observe them or not aside--we only associate these with thought because, in all observed circumstances, thought occurs when nerve synapses fire. That we have observed this in all past cases does not necessarily mean that the firing of nerve synapses causes thought. It makes it very likely, but if there is any possibility of variation, it would follow that the firing of nerve synapses is not the absolute cause of thought. (if you can't tell, I put little stock in statistics)
The problem is in attempting to argue from particulars to universals, then back again. Biologists classify observed animals by observed similarities: e.g., all insects have six legs. More properly put, though, all animals with exoskeletons and six legs are classified as insects. Scientists observe all animals with exoskeletons and six legs, and then arbitrarily class them together. There is nothing inherently wrong in this, as a means of referential classification, but they must remember that the proposition "all insects have six legs" is only true by their own stipulated definition as to what an insect is. If the universal "insect" only has definition in reference to the particulars which it comprises (grasshoppers, ants, cicadas), then any further particulars that are thrust into that universal are thus classified, not because of any relation they have to the universal, but the relation they have to the other particulars.
It is in this way that postmodernists rightly critique modernists for their dogmatism: the modernist has no right to be dogmatic when all he is doing is imposing subjective categories upon facts that may or may not be ultimately categorized. Postmodernists rightly critique all philosophies based upon human autonomy as necessarily subjective.
The error of the postmodernists, though, is in then positing that there is no objective truth. That our subjective systems are not objective does not mean that there is no true object of knowledge, but rather that our systems probably do not coincide with it. They are also correct to say that we cannot know what objective truth is, starting from ourselves. Any attempt to categorize is, as they constantly point out, arbitrary.
There is, however, at least one option that would explain and give an adequate foundation for knowledge: a combination of external and internal interpretive revelation by a Person who is non-creation, yet involved in creation. It cannot be solely external revelation (as with the Deists), for that assumes (wrongly) that our senses are adequate to accurately read the world around us AND that our categorization of "brute facts" is correct." This is strict particularism. Nor can it be solely internal revelation (certain forms of mysticism), for then our knowledge has no correlation with observation, the nature of external being in our view is compromised, and there is no higher common standard by which we can appeal to others. Nor can it even be a definite external revelation with an indefinite internal revelation (such as the "suasive grace" of Wesleyans, Arminians, Romanists, etc.), for then we still have no KNOWLEDGE that our belief correlates to truth, only a persuasion that it does so. Nor can the Person be a part of, or the whole of, creation (as with the pantheists), for then it speaks with no authority as a universal cause of being, and there is no allowance or meaning for particulars; this is strict universalism (in the metaphysical sense, not the soteriological). Strict particularism has facts with no meaning, thus no way to interpret the brute facts; strict universalism has meaning, but no distinct facts to mean anything.
For us to have knowledge, we must have a definite external revelation to which our knowledge must correlate, and definite internal revelation that the external revelation is true. We have the former in the Bible, which purports to be the very words of God, and through which He tells us what the world is, what the meaning of it and its events are, how it came to be, and where it is going. Through it, He tells us who we are, and how we ought to live and why. The latter we have in the witness of the Holy Spirit, by the grace of regeneration and the gift of faith (what is popularly known as "irresistible grace," but more properly as "efficient grace"), which He sovereignly grants to those whom the Father has loved since before the beginning of time.
"For since, in the wisdom of God, the world through wisdom did not know God, it pleased God through the foolishness of the message preached to save those who believe. For Jews request a sign, and Greeks seek after wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling block and to the Greeks foolishness, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God....the hidden wisdom which God ordained before the ages for our glory, which none of the rulers of this age knew; for had they known, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory....But God has revealed them to us through His spirit....Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God, that we might know the things that have been freely given to us by God." (1 Cor. 1:21-24, 2:7, 8, 10, 12)
Thursday, February 14, 2008
Differing Modes of Defense: the Presuppositional and Classical Apologetics
By Colin Cutler
Final Exam for Principles of Biblical Reasoning (used by permission)
Dr. Martin Erdmann
A Defense of the Faith
“But sanctify the Lord in your hearts; and be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in you with meekness and fear.”
1 Peter 3:15 is the verse of commission for all apologists: the Greek word translated “answer”—apologia—speaks of a legal defense before a tribunal. Christians are to be able to defend their faith from the attacks of unbelievers. They are told to be able to make a defense to every man who asks what the reason is for their faith.
A few points can be made here. 1) We are to be knowledgeable about what it is we believe; we cannot defend something we do not know. 2) We are to believe it and act upon it (“sanctify the Lord in your hearts…having a good conscience; that whereas they speak evil of you, as of evil doers, they may be ashamed that falsely accuse your good conversation in Christ.” 1 Peter 3:15-16). 3) We have assurance that our faith is reasonable. Contrary to some of the anti-intellectual fideists who say that one must simply “have faith” without or contrary to reason, we are told that we do indeed have a reason for our hope that we must defend. Faith is not simply a volitional leap, but is a rational—I will argue the sole rational—way of interpreting the empirical and metaphysical data. 4) We are to defend our faith with meekness and fear. We are not to fear man—though we are to be humble, with the knowledge at the forefront of our minds that the only difference between us as Christians and others as unbelievers is the grace of God—but are to fear God. We must not sacrifice or compromise the authority of His Word in our attempts to defend it.
Paul reasoned with the Jews from Scripture (Acts 9:22, 17:17) and the Greeks (Acts 9:29, 17:18-34), and Christ defended Himself with logic (John 10:37, 38).
There are in the modern day two broad schools of thought on Christian apologetics; there is the presuppositional system, which broadly fits under an Augustinian conception of a reason subordinate to faith, and the Thomistic system, which seeks a synthesis of faith and reason as equals operating in different spheres.
Classical Apologetics
Classical (or Thomistic) apologetics is the predominant system in the church currently. It traces its descent from St. Thomas Aquinas, a 12th century theologian and philosopher. He was heavily influenced by Aristotle’s works on logic and philosophy and sought to synthesize Aristotle’s works with the Scriptures and beliefs of orthodox Christianity. His method effectively dichotomizes faith and reason, assigning them different realms of responsibility. Faith is concerned with special revelation (that area of knowledge known and knowable only by immediate divine revelation, specifically in Holy Scripture), and reason with general revelation.
More relevantly, it generally holds that reason, just like the rest of man, has a propensity towards, but not a bondage to, sin and the denial of God. Man is still able to reach some amount of truth by means of his reason, though admittedly not enough for his salvation. Just as Aristotle was able to come to the right conclusion that God is one, is just, and is the source of all things, so, Thomists argue, man can come to the realization of some of God’s truths, and from these can a defense be made for the Christian system of belief, and possibly a foundation laid for faith itself. Thomists thus emphasize general revelation in their apologetic system and tend to reason from what they believe to be common ground held with their opponents.
Presuppositional Apologetics
Presuppositional (or Van Tillian) apologetics is a distinctively Reformed defense of the faith. It was first articulated by Cornelius Van Til, a conservative Reformed professor at Princeton and later Westminster Theological Seminary during the early 1900s. His apologetic system is self-consciously Calvinistic in its view of man and his reason, and God and His creation, and was forged against the backdrop of rationalism, idealism, and the beginnings of a pervasion of postmodern skepticism and nihilism in Western culture. Van Til articulated the idea that on the Christian epistemological foundation of faith, and only on this foundation, could man make sense of his existence and of his world. Thus faith—and not just any faith, but specifically that of Christian theism—was not only reasonable, it was also a prerequisite to all reason. Further, it was a prerequisite not only to good reason, but to any rationality. It is in this that presuppositionalism is revolutionary. Many others had articulated the idea that faith was reasonable, and also that faith was a necessary condition for good reason—Christian reason—but hitherto it had not been clearly articulated that all views except Christian theism were irrational and that Christian theism was a prerequisite for all rationality. In this, Van Til applied the doctrine of Total Depravity in positing that all unbelievers were irrational in part because their professed worldview was inconsistent, but ultimately because they were willfully suppressing their innate knowledge of God.
Presuppositionalism is also distinct in that it defends Christianity as a system: it does not start with the existence of God and then proceed from there to proving the Scriptures as inerrant and the atonement as rational. On the contrary, Van Til was concerned with defending all of Reformed orthodoxy and using the distinctives of Reformed orthodoxy as complements to his system. He realized that this was, in a sense, begging the question of authority, and he responded to this with the valid point that all appeals to authority must by their very nature beg the question of authority. What one must do, then, is to show the ultimate authority of unregenerate man to end in ultimate inconsistency. In the intramural debate between apologetic systems, he applied this in order to point out that if a Christian argued for the authority of the Bible on the basis of prime reason, then it was reason that was authoritative, not the Bible. If the Bible depends on anything other than itself to prove itself, then it does not speak with the authority that it claims for itself.
Presuppositionalism does not say that man cannot know some truth. It does say, and emphatically says, that unregenerate man cannot make sense of truth. For knowing truth divorced from its context and without foundation is hardly knowing truth at all, and is certainly an incoherent way to look at truth. He may grasp some principles that a Christian would agree are true, but the unbeliever has no way of knowing why these principles are true or how they should be applied unless he borrows from the Christian’s own absolutist worldview.
A Comparison of the Two Systems
Thomism has the advantage of antiquity and tradition behind it, and is not to be despised. After all, it was the system of choice for most of the church’s apologists and philosophers for about 800 years, whereas presuppositionalism has been articulated for about a tenth of that time. However, Thomism has many of the same problems that were resolved in the theological reformation of the 16th and 17th centuries, and Van Til viewed himself as simply following the return to these Protestant doctrines to their logical conclusion when applied to apologetics. He considered himself to belong firmly in the same theological vein as Augustine and Calvin—indeed, in his Defense of the Faith, he defends himself as often from the Calvinistic creeds as directly from Scripture. In some ways, he thought that the Protestant Reformation, in reforming its theology, had neglected to reform its apologetics to fit its theology. It could be argued, indeed, that if Calvin had been a philosopher instead of a theologian, he may have agreed with Van Til that the existence of reason itself required the existence of God (Institutes of the Christian Religion I.5.4).
The chief and fundamental error of Thomism is in its concession of autonomy to man’s reason. Man tends to consider himself as rationally prime—if he is to trust anything, it must be because he considers it sensible. In essence, man sets himself up as his own god. Thomism concedes this in principle and tries to present man with proofs that are held in some supposed common ground. Some men may acknowledge this common ground, but if they are cross-examined, they will realize that they have no basis for any foundationalism at all, let alone a common ground with Christian philosophers. Presuppositionalism performs this cross-examination and tears the ground from under unbelievers by showing their inconsistencies in reason and even in attempting to reason.
Presuppositionalism has no quarrel with those who would use rational and empirical evidence to convince those willing to be convinced by those means. Their point, however, is precisely that there is no one naturally willing to be convinced. To the unbeliever, the evidence could conceivably point either way, so the choice is left to him, and it is perfectly rational for him to refuse. It is a matter of interpretation. Presuppositionalism recognizes this and attacks the unbeliever’s standards of proof and interpretation, showing them to have no basis in his own atheistic or skeptical philosophy, but that, to make sense of anything, he must submit his own interpretation to the One who has created the world and grants it meaning. Presuppositionalists take seriously and literally the idea that “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom [some translations “knowledge].” (Proverbs 1:7) Without the fear of God, there is no wisdom and knowledge.
As a note, the Reformed doctrine of God’s exhaustive providence and presuppositional apologetics are complementary—for if anything can happen outside of God’s ordination, then there is an element of chance in the world which leaves all facts open to autonomous interpretation. If God has not preinterpreted an event and granted it meaning, then it has only and every meaning that any individual who sees it assigns to it. He could assign it to luck or determinism or free will, but that event does not necessarily point to God. It is, as Van Til put it, simply a “brute fact.” This is in direct contradiction to the Psalm which says “the heavens declare the glory of God” and the Proverb (16:4) which says that “The Lord hath made all things for His purposes, even the wicked for the day of destruction.”
Further, presuppositional apologetics, by its strict adherence to Sola Scriptura and its commitment to defending Christian doctrine as a system rather than piecemeal, can preserve the doctrine of providence over and against those who consider it to be unreasonable, both within and without the church. To those outside of the church, the presuppositional apologist will point out that by denying the incoherence of juxtaposing God’s providence with human responsibility, they are simply begging the question of authority. To those inside the church, the same could be said, but if a person accepts the truth of God as presented by a presuppositionalist, he could completely avoid the erroneous doctrine of autonomous will. With Scripture as his sole and sufficient source of authoritative truth, and reason subordinate to and founded upon Scripture, he would avoid the error of those who try to subject Scripture to reason. Thomism, on the other hand, opens the door to such aberrant doctrines by conceding to man’s reason the ability to know truth independently of context and authority. It is this basis (or lack thereof) that allows man to invent doctrines that make sense to him as a man and hold them as true. If reason is prime, then it is allowed to independently draw conclusions; and in more extreme cases, it will even subordinate Scripture to itself.
A Word of Caution
Presuppositionalism must be seen in its full context as a distinctively Reformed apologetic. As a corollary of Reformed doctrine, it can only be fairly criticized by those who keep these doctrines in mind as well. Specifically, some have decried Van Til’s system as presenting a “magic bullet” cure to the problem of unbelief when such is not the case at all, nor has it ever been represented as such by Van Til or any responsible student of his. Van Til, along with all historic Calvinists, believed firmly in God’s sovereignty over salvation and belief and unbelief. As such, he believed that no amount of rational proof, even the epistemological proof of his transcendental system, could finally change the unbeliever’s heart to the point that he would submit to the claims of Christ. Only the Holy Spirit could do this, and He is sovereign in His dispensation of the saving grace of regeneration and faith.
Also, Van Til’s system must be viewed against the backdrop not only of the prevalent rationalism and idealism of his time, but also against the rising postmodernist and nihilistic systems. In America and especially in the church and school where he taught (both of which when they finally liberalized, he left and helped form a conservative nucleus elsewhere with J. Gresham Machen), a wave of pluralism was rising. Classical apologetics could simply not compete with this, not because the evidence was faulty, but because completely different standards of interpretation were being used. Indeed, one may wonder if the shift of the Western mind from modern to postmodern did not spell the obsolescence of Classical apologetics. One thing is certain, that shift did spell the end of common methods of rational interpretation and common standards of authority that had, till then, been prevalent in Western intellectual culture.
Van Til’s system is, then, not only an application of Reformed theology to apologetics, but also an attempt to deal with the shifting intellectual atmosphere and to preserve an absolutely biblical way of engaging each of the exploding fragments of the Western intellectual culture. Further, in its ability to do this, it also remains helpful for Christians who are dealing with these questions and preserves confidence in the old institutions of Reformed orthodoxy. Most of all, though, it seeks to glorify God by holding His truth unsullied and absolute, just as it proclaims itself to be.
Conclusion
Despite the antiquity of the venerable Thomistic system, it preserves in its root the poison of Romanism manifest in the syncretism of paganism and Christianity. A fully Reformed apologetic requires the acknowledgement of God’s primacy in all. God has revealed Himself primarily through His apostles and prophets in the divinely inspired Scriptures, and it is to these, not abstract concepts of reason, that the Christian apologist must demand allegiance. The Christian apologist must realize himself and show to his debater that these “abstract concepts of reason” would have no existence at all were Christianity not true. This is the heart of presuppositionalism—that the fear of the Lord ought not be a conclusion to reasoned proofs, nor something dichotomized from reasoned proofs, but rather is and by right ought to be “the beginning of wisdom.” With Augustine, the presuppositionalist says “Credo ut intelligam”—I believe in order to understand.
Final Exam for Principles of Biblical Reasoning (used by permission)
Dr. Martin Erdmann
A Defense of the Faith
“But sanctify the Lord in your hearts; and be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in you with meekness and fear.”
1 Peter 3:15 is the verse of commission for all apologists: the Greek word translated “answer”—apologia—speaks of a legal defense before a tribunal. Christians are to be able to defend their faith from the attacks of unbelievers. They are told to be able to make a defense to every man who asks what the reason is for their faith.
A few points can be made here. 1) We are to be knowledgeable about what it is we believe; we cannot defend something we do not know. 2) We are to believe it and act upon it (“sanctify the Lord in your hearts…having a good conscience; that whereas they speak evil of you, as of evil doers, they may be ashamed that falsely accuse your good conversation in Christ.” 1 Peter 3:15-16). 3) We have assurance that our faith is reasonable. Contrary to some of the anti-intellectual fideists who say that one must simply “have faith” without or contrary to reason, we are told that we do indeed have a reason for our hope that we must defend. Faith is not simply a volitional leap, but is a rational—I will argue the sole rational—way of interpreting the empirical and metaphysical data. 4) We are to defend our faith with meekness and fear. We are not to fear man—though we are to be humble, with the knowledge at the forefront of our minds that the only difference between us as Christians and others as unbelievers is the grace of God—but are to fear God. We must not sacrifice or compromise the authority of His Word in our attempts to defend it.
Paul reasoned with the Jews from Scripture (Acts 9:22, 17:17) and the Greeks (Acts 9:29, 17:18-34), and Christ defended Himself with logic (John 10:37, 38).
There are in the modern day two broad schools of thought on Christian apologetics; there is the presuppositional system, which broadly fits under an Augustinian conception of a reason subordinate to faith, and the Thomistic system, which seeks a synthesis of faith and reason as equals operating in different spheres.
Classical Apologetics
Classical (or Thomistic) apologetics is the predominant system in the church currently. It traces its descent from St. Thomas Aquinas, a 12th century theologian and philosopher. He was heavily influenced by Aristotle’s works on logic and philosophy and sought to synthesize Aristotle’s works with the Scriptures and beliefs of orthodox Christianity. His method effectively dichotomizes faith and reason, assigning them different realms of responsibility. Faith is concerned with special revelation (that area of knowledge known and knowable only by immediate divine revelation, specifically in Holy Scripture), and reason with general revelation.
More relevantly, it generally holds that reason, just like the rest of man, has a propensity towards, but not a bondage to, sin and the denial of God. Man is still able to reach some amount of truth by means of his reason, though admittedly not enough for his salvation. Just as Aristotle was able to come to the right conclusion that God is one, is just, and is the source of all things, so, Thomists argue, man can come to the realization of some of God’s truths, and from these can a defense be made for the Christian system of belief, and possibly a foundation laid for faith itself. Thomists thus emphasize general revelation in their apologetic system and tend to reason from what they believe to be common ground held with their opponents.
Presuppositional Apologetics
Presuppositional (or Van Tillian) apologetics is a distinctively Reformed defense of the faith. It was first articulated by Cornelius Van Til, a conservative Reformed professor at Princeton and later Westminster Theological Seminary during the early 1900s. His apologetic system is self-consciously Calvinistic in its view of man and his reason, and God and His creation, and was forged against the backdrop of rationalism, idealism, and the beginnings of a pervasion of postmodern skepticism and nihilism in Western culture. Van Til articulated the idea that on the Christian epistemological foundation of faith, and only on this foundation, could man make sense of his existence and of his world. Thus faith—and not just any faith, but specifically that of Christian theism—was not only reasonable, it was also a prerequisite to all reason. Further, it was a prerequisite not only to good reason, but to any rationality. It is in this that presuppositionalism is revolutionary. Many others had articulated the idea that faith was reasonable, and also that faith was a necessary condition for good reason—Christian reason—but hitherto it had not been clearly articulated that all views except Christian theism were irrational and that Christian theism was a prerequisite for all rationality. In this, Van Til applied the doctrine of Total Depravity in positing that all unbelievers were irrational in part because their professed worldview was inconsistent, but ultimately because they were willfully suppressing their innate knowledge of God.
Presuppositionalism is also distinct in that it defends Christianity as a system: it does not start with the existence of God and then proceed from there to proving the Scriptures as inerrant and the atonement as rational. On the contrary, Van Til was concerned with defending all of Reformed orthodoxy and using the distinctives of Reformed orthodoxy as complements to his system. He realized that this was, in a sense, begging the question of authority, and he responded to this with the valid point that all appeals to authority must by their very nature beg the question of authority. What one must do, then, is to show the ultimate authority of unregenerate man to end in ultimate inconsistency. In the intramural debate between apologetic systems, he applied this in order to point out that if a Christian argued for the authority of the Bible on the basis of prime reason, then it was reason that was authoritative, not the Bible. If the Bible depends on anything other than itself to prove itself, then it does not speak with the authority that it claims for itself.
Presuppositionalism does not say that man cannot know some truth. It does say, and emphatically says, that unregenerate man cannot make sense of truth. For knowing truth divorced from its context and without foundation is hardly knowing truth at all, and is certainly an incoherent way to look at truth. He may grasp some principles that a Christian would agree are true, but the unbeliever has no way of knowing why these principles are true or how they should be applied unless he borrows from the Christian’s own absolutist worldview.
A Comparison of the Two Systems
Thomism has the advantage of antiquity and tradition behind it, and is not to be despised. After all, it was the system of choice for most of the church’s apologists and philosophers for about 800 years, whereas presuppositionalism has been articulated for about a tenth of that time. However, Thomism has many of the same problems that were resolved in the theological reformation of the 16th and 17th centuries, and Van Til viewed himself as simply following the return to these Protestant doctrines to their logical conclusion when applied to apologetics. He considered himself to belong firmly in the same theological vein as Augustine and Calvin—indeed, in his Defense of the Faith, he defends himself as often from the Calvinistic creeds as directly from Scripture. In some ways, he thought that the Protestant Reformation, in reforming its theology, had neglected to reform its apologetics to fit its theology. It could be argued, indeed, that if Calvin had been a philosopher instead of a theologian, he may have agreed with Van Til that the existence of reason itself required the existence of God (Institutes of the Christian Religion I.5.4).
The chief and fundamental error of Thomism is in its concession of autonomy to man’s reason. Man tends to consider himself as rationally prime—if he is to trust anything, it must be because he considers it sensible. In essence, man sets himself up as his own god. Thomism concedes this in principle and tries to present man with proofs that are held in some supposed common ground. Some men may acknowledge this common ground, but if they are cross-examined, they will realize that they have no basis for any foundationalism at all, let alone a common ground with Christian philosophers. Presuppositionalism performs this cross-examination and tears the ground from under unbelievers by showing their inconsistencies in reason and even in attempting to reason.
Presuppositionalism has no quarrel with those who would use rational and empirical evidence to convince those willing to be convinced by those means. Their point, however, is precisely that there is no one naturally willing to be convinced. To the unbeliever, the evidence could conceivably point either way, so the choice is left to him, and it is perfectly rational for him to refuse. It is a matter of interpretation. Presuppositionalism recognizes this and attacks the unbeliever’s standards of proof and interpretation, showing them to have no basis in his own atheistic or skeptical philosophy, but that, to make sense of anything, he must submit his own interpretation to the One who has created the world and grants it meaning. Presuppositionalists take seriously and literally the idea that “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom [some translations “knowledge].” (Proverbs 1:7) Without the fear of God, there is no wisdom and knowledge.
As a note, the Reformed doctrine of God’s exhaustive providence and presuppositional apologetics are complementary—for if anything can happen outside of God’s ordination, then there is an element of chance in the world which leaves all facts open to autonomous interpretation. If God has not preinterpreted an event and granted it meaning, then it has only and every meaning that any individual who sees it assigns to it. He could assign it to luck or determinism or free will, but that event does not necessarily point to God. It is, as Van Til put it, simply a “brute fact.” This is in direct contradiction to the Psalm which says “the heavens declare the glory of God” and the Proverb (16:4) which says that “The Lord hath made all things for His purposes, even the wicked for the day of destruction.”
Further, presuppositional apologetics, by its strict adherence to Sola Scriptura and its commitment to defending Christian doctrine as a system rather than piecemeal, can preserve the doctrine of providence over and against those who consider it to be unreasonable, both within and without the church. To those outside of the church, the presuppositional apologist will point out that by denying the incoherence of juxtaposing God’s providence with human responsibility, they are simply begging the question of authority. To those inside the church, the same could be said, but if a person accepts the truth of God as presented by a presuppositionalist, he could completely avoid the erroneous doctrine of autonomous will. With Scripture as his sole and sufficient source of authoritative truth, and reason subordinate to and founded upon Scripture, he would avoid the error of those who try to subject Scripture to reason. Thomism, on the other hand, opens the door to such aberrant doctrines by conceding to man’s reason the ability to know truth independently of context and authority. It is this basis (or lack thereof) that allows man to invent doctrines that make sense to him as a man and hold them as true. If reason is prime, then it is allowed to independently draw conclusions; and in more extreme cases, it will even subordinate Scripture to itself.
A Word of Caution
Presuppositionalism must be seen in its full context as a distinctively Reformed apologetic. As a corollary of Reformed doctrine, it can only be fairly criticized by those who keep these doctrines in mind as well. Specifically, some have decried Van Til’s system as presenting a “magic bullet” cure to the problem of unbelief when such is not the case at all, nor has it ever been represented as such by Van Til or any responsible student of his. Van Til, along with all historic Calvinists, believed firmly in God’s sovereignty over salvation and belief and unbelief. As such, he believed that no amount of rational proof, even the epistemological proof of his transcendental system, could finally change the unbeliever’s heart to the point that he would submit to the claims of Christ. Only the Holy Spirit could do this, and He is sovereign in His dispensation of the saving grace of regeneration and faith.
Also, Van Til’s system must be viewed against the backdrop not only of the prevalent rationalism and idealism of his time, but also against the rising postmodernist and nihilistic systems. In America and especially in the church and school where he taught (both of which when they finally liberalized, he left and helped form a conservative nucleus elsewhere with J. Gresham Machen), a wave of pluralism was rising. Classical apologetics could simply not compete with this, not because the evidence was faulty, but because completely different standards of interpretation were being used. Indeed, one may wonder if the shift of the Western mind from modern to postmodern did not spell the obsolescence of Classical apologetics. One thing is certain, that shift did spell the end of common methods of rational interpretation and common standards of authority that had, till then, been prevalent in Western intellectual culture.
Van Til’s system is, then, not only an application of Reformed theology to apologetics, but also an attempt to deal with the shifting intellectual atmosphere and to preserve an absolutely biblical way of engaging each of the exploding fragments of the Western intellectual culture. Further, in its ability to do this, it also remains helpful for Christians who are dealing with these questions and preserves confidence in the old institutions of Reformed orthodoxy. Most of all, though, it seeks to glorify God by holding His truth unsullied and absolute, just as it proclaims itself to be.
Conclusion
Despite the antiquity of the venerable Thomistic system, it preserves in its root the poison of Romanism manifest in the syncretism of paganism and Christianity. A fully Reformed apologetic requires the acknowledgement of God’s primacy in all. God has revealed Himself primarily through His apostles and prophets in the divinely inspired Scriptures, and it is to these, not abstract concepts of reason, that the Christian apologist must demand allegiance. The Christian apologist must realize himself and show to his debater that these “abstract concepts of reason” would have no existence at all were Christianity not true. This is the heart of presuppositionalism—that the fear of the Lord ought not be a conclusion to reasoned proofs, nor something dichotomized from reasoned proofs, but rather is and by right ought to be “the beginning of wisdom.” With Augustine, the presuppositionalist says “Credo ut intelligam”—I believe in order to understand.
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